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WILLIAM H. HUTCHINSON, Respondent, v. CITY OF
LOS ANGELES et a1., Appellants.

)

[1] Licenses-OoDStruction of Laws.-A Municipal eode section
providing t1.at every perSOll engaged 1n an occupation as an
independent contractor and not as an employee of another shall
pay 8 designated license fee per year and an additional sum for
each fractional part of the gross receipts in excess of a named
sum, exacts payment of the license tax as a condition precedent
to engaging in the particular occupation, and payment is measured by the gross receipts derived therefrom.
[2] Commerce-Regulation.-The activities of independent eontractors engaged exclusively in the business of furnishing maintenance and repair services to ships employed only in interstate
and foreign commerce while the ships are in harbor, are subject
to regulation by Congress under the power granted to it by the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
[3] Id.-Regulation.-In the absence of contrary Congressional
action, the state may regulate or tax local activities essential
to interstate commerce 80 long as the regulation or tax does
not unduly burden that commerce.
[4] Id.-Tuation.-A city may lay • tax, measured by. gross
receipts, on the local activities of independent contr3ctors
engaged exclusively in the business of furnishing maintenance
and repair services to ships employed only in interstate and
foreign commerce while the ships are in harbor.
[5] Id.-Tuation.-When there is no danger that several states
will impose cumulative tax burdens on the same subject, a tax
upon an activity that is a local incident o~ interstate commerce
may be measured by gross receipts from that activity.
(6] Id.-Tuation. - Activities of independent contractors engaged exclusively in the business of furnishing maintenance
and repair services to ships employed only in interstate and
foreign commerce while t.hose ships are in harbor, "are events
apart from the flow of commerce," and a tax thereon is therefore self-supporting. The fact that the ships might require
(2) See 5 Oal.Jur. 238; 11 Am.Jur. 11, 19.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, § 16; [2,3] Commerce, § 3;
[4-8] Commerce, § 8.
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similar service in the harbors of other cities does not make
taxation by each jurisdiction a multiple tax burden, and interstate commerce is not unduly burdened because such contractors are required to bear a fair share of the cost of the
local government whose protection they enjoy.
[7] Id.-Taxation.-Whatever immunity from local taxation might
attach to the interstate carriage of cargo does not extend to
ship servicing operations which do not begin until that transportation has ended and the transported cargo has been removed from the ships.
[8] Id.-Taxation.-The force of the distinction between a tax
imposed on "the very processes of interstate commerce" and a
tax imposed on local "incidents of the commerce" is not diminished by the fact that a tax on the local activities of independent contractors engaged in furnishing maintenance and
repair services to ships employed only in interstate and foreign
commerce is imposed on the privilege of eonducting those
activities.

Actions for declaratory relief. Judgments for plaintiffs
reversed.

)

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, Assistant
City Attorney, and Lester L. Lev, Deputy City Attorney, for
Appellants.
Ball, Hunt & Hart and Joseph A. Ball for Respondents.
'-

..;

TRAYNOR, J .-Section 21.190 of the Municipal Code of ;;the City of Los Angeles provides that ., Every person engaged ~
in any trade, calling, occupation, vocation, profession or other .~
means of livelihood, as an independent contractor and not as an
employee of another, and not speCifically licensed by other
provisions of this Article, shall pay a license fee in the sum
of $12.00 per calendar year or fractional part thereof for the
first $12,000 or less of gross receipts, and in addition thereto,
the sum of $1.00 per year for each $1,000 or fractional part
thereof, of gross receipts in excess of $12,000." [1] Payment of the license tax is a condition precedent to engaging
in the enumerated occupations.· It is therefore exacted for
the privilege of carrying on an occupation, and is measured by
." ~ 21.10. No person shall engage in any businees, profession, trade
or occupation, or perform any act, required to be licensed under the
provillionB of thill Article until Bueb license ill first obtained."
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the gross receipts derived therefrom. (Union Pac. R. R. Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 825, 830 [128 P.2d
408) .)

Plaintiffs are independent contractors engaged exclusively
in furnishing maintenance and repair services to ships
employed only in interstate and foreign commerce while those
ships are tied to docks or anchored in t.he harbors of Los
Angeles, Newport-Balboa, Long Beach, San Diego, and Port
Hueneme. The services consist of painting the ships. removing
scale, cleaning tanks, chain lockers and boilers, removing
ballast, sandblasting ships' sides, and handling ships' stores
by taking them from trucks of provision merchants at the
dock, trucking them from the dock onto the ships and placing
them in storerooms on board. Only gross receipts from these
services on ships anchored or docked in Los Angeles harbor
are included in the measure of the tax.
Plaintiffs brought these actions for declaratory relief, con·
tending that the license tax as applied to them is unconsti·
tutional on the ground that it unduly burdens interstate and
foreign commerce and is therefore prohibited by the com·
merce clause of the United States Constitution. From a judg.
ment declaring the tax as applied to plaintiffs unconstitutional
and permanently enjoining its collection. defendant city
appeals.
[2] It is undisputed that plaintiffs are engaged in local
activities essential to interstate commerce. These activities
are subject to regulation by Congress under the power granted
to it by the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
(National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.s. 1,37-41 [57 8.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R.
1352); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 [61 8.Ct.
451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430] ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 [32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327];
Southern Pacific Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 78-2, 790 [151 P.
277, L.R.A. 1916E 916).) [3] In the absence of contrary
Congressional action, however, the state may regulate or tax
such activities so long as the regulation or tax does not unduly
burden that commerce. (South Carolina State Highway Dept.
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-185 [58 S.Ct. 510, 82
L.Ed. 734] ; Aero MayfTower Transit Co. v. Board of R. R.
Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 502-503 [68 8.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99] i
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 37-39 [68
S. Ct. 358, 92 L.Ed. 455).) The validity of the tax therefore
does not depend solely on whether plaintiffs' activities are
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interstate or intrastate commerce. "In a case like this nothing 1
is gained and clarity is lost, by not starting with recognition
of the fact that it is interstate commerce which the state is'
seeking to reach and candidly facing the real question whether;
what the State is exacting is a constitutionally fair demand by I
the State for that aspect of the interstate comttlerce to which I
the State bears a special relation." (Central Greyhound Lines, .\
Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661 [68 S.Ot. 1260, 92 L.Ed. I
1
1633] ; Memphis Natural Gaa Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87 1
[68 S.Ot. 1475, 92 L.Ed. 1832] ; Aero Mayflower Tranait Co.
v. Board of R. R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 502 [68 S.Ct. 167,'
92 L.Ed. 99] ; Western Litle Stock v. Bureau of Retlenue, 303
U.S. 250,256 [58 S.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R. 944];
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 47 [60 S.Ct.
388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876] ; Chicago Bridge 4 Iron
Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 162, 172-173 [119 P.2d 945] ; Barker
Bros., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Oal.2d 603, 60~ [76 P.2d
97].) "Interstate business must pay its way" (Western Litle
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 [58 S.Ct. 546,
82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R. 944]), provided it does not pay too
much or too often. Since the tax imposed by the defendant
does not make it do either, we are of the opinion that the judgments must be reversed.
[41 In view of the recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Memphis Natural Gaa Co. v. Stone, 335
U.S. 80 (68 S.Ct. 1475, 92 L.Ed. 18321, and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 [68 8.0t. 1260,
92 L.Ed. 1633], the city may clearly tax plaintiffs' local
activities and the gross receipts therefrom. In Memphis Natural Gaa Co. v. 8tone, supra, the court sustained a state tax on
a f.oreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in operating gas lines through the state.· The tax was
imposed on "the local activities in maintaining, keeping in
repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the system"
-Miss. Code .93]4: "For the year 1940 and annually theroafter,
there ahall be and ill hereby imposed, levied and ageged upon every
corporation, auooiation or joint Btook company, aB hereinbefore defined,
organized and exiBting under and by virtue of the laws of Bome other
state, territory or country, or organized and existing without any specific
statutory authority, now, or hereafter doing business within this lltate.
aB hereinbefore defined, a franchise or excise tax equal to '1.50 of each
'1,000.00 or fraction thereof of the value of the capital used, invested or
employed within this IItate, except as hereinafter provided. It being the
Jlurpose of this aectio.D to' require the payment of a tax by all organizations not organized under the laws of this state, meuured by the
amouut of capital or its equivalent., fOT whit.h Buch organization reeei.eI
the beI1eAt and protection of the government and laWi ef the .tate."

)
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and was measured by a proportion of the capital employt'd
within the state. (335 U.S. at 82-83.) I I Such local incicil'uts
form a sound basis for taxation by a state of foreign corpora·
tions doing interstate business. For example, we have upheld
state taxes on sales after completion of the interstate transit,
McGoldrick v. Berwwd- White Coal Mimng Co., 309 U.S. 33
[60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128 A.L.R. 876] ; on production
of electricity for interstate commerce, Utah Power & L. Co. v.
Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 [52 S.Ct. 548, 76 L.Ed .. 1038], compare
Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 297 U.S.
650,655 [56 S.Ct. 608, 80 L.Ed. 956J ; a privilege tax on the
operation of machines for the production of electricity to
drive gas in interstate commerce, Coverdale v. ArkansasLouisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 [58 RCt. 736, 82 L.Ed.
1043] ; a use tax on rails shipped interstate for immediate
incorporation into an interstate transportation system, South.
ern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher. 306 U.S. 167 [59 S.Ct. 389, 83
L.Ed.586].
"We have upheld a franchise tax on a foreign corporation
authorized to do business and making sales in a state other
than its actual or business domicile, Ford v Beauchamp. 308
U.S. 331 [60 S.Ct. 273, 84 L.Ed. 304\ , 8 privilege tax on a
foreign corporation doing business in the stat(' npon a proportion of property in the taxing stat(' that was computNl by
using interstate commerce as an element. Rtlmp R01rplll Co.
v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 142 S.Ct. 305. 66 L.Ed. 622];
Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 (l.S 511 [50 RCt.
383, 74 L.Ed. 1004J ; an excise on intrastatt' manufacturing,
added to an ad valorem tax and m('asurf'd by salf's. inclllciing
out of state, American Mfg. Co. v. St. L01tlS. 250 U.S. 459
[39 S.Ct. 522, 63 L.Ed. 1084], and s('e Pow('ll. 60 Harv.L.Rev.
508 and 727, Freeman v. Rewit, 329 U.S. 249, 255 [67 S.Ct.
274, 91 L.Ed. 265] ; a Iicens(' for storing goods at rest in the
state under a transit privilege, Independent Warehouses, 111c.
v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 [67 RCt. 1062,91 L.Ed. 1346]." (335
U.S. 80.) In upholding th(' tax the prevailing opinion r!·(·o~·
nized that "This transportation by pipe lin(' with rleliYf'ri(>S
within the state at wholesale only is interstate busint'ss" (3:{:;
U.S. at 85), but held that, notwithl-itanding this fad. "wllt're
the corporations carryon a local activity !!uffieientl.\' spparllt('
from the interstate commerce state taxI'S may be \'ali(lI.v laid.
even thougoh th(' exaction from the business of tilt' t8xpa~'f>r
is precisely the same as though the tax haJ been levieu UpUll
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the interstate business itself." (335 U.8. at 87.) It is clear that'>
it was not intended by this language to imply that the tax:;~
payer was not engaged in interstate commerce in carrying on'~,
such an activity· for the opinion goes on to say "But thef
choice of a local incident for the tax, without more, is not l,
enough. There are always convenient local incidents in every'~
interstate operation. Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra [327i
U.S. 416 (66 S.Ct. 586,90 L.Ed. 760, 162 A.L.R. 844), at 423).,
The incident selected should be one that does not lend itself to'
repeated exactions in other states. Otherwise intrastate com."
merce may be preferred over interstate commerce" [citing"
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255,','
58 8.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823. 115 A.L.R. 944]. Since the risk:
of repeated exactions in other states attends interstate, not
intrastate commerce, it is obvious that the court regarded the
activities in question, maintaining and keeping the pipe line
system in repair, as interstate commerce and the tax as a
legitimate one because it was apportioned.t
The local activities of the taxpayers in maintaining and
keeping in repair ships that deliver cargo interstate are !
••• To call ('ommerce in fact interstate 'local commerce' because under
given set of circumstances, as in the Lehigh Valley case [145 U.S. 192
(12 8.0t. 806. 36 L.Ed. 672)], 8 particular exertion of State power is
not rendered invalid by the Commerc.e Clause is to indulge in a fiction.
Especially in the disposition of constitutional issues are legal fictions
hazardous, because of the risk of confounding users and not merely
readers. The kind of confusion to which the Lehigh Valley opinion has
given rise results from employing a needless fiction-ealling commerce
local which in fact is interstate-as a mannel' of stating that a particular
exercise of State power id not invalid even though it affects interstate
tommerce. The difficult task of determining whether a phase of commerce, concededly interstate, is subject to a particular incidence of State
regUlation, through taxation or otherwise, is not lessened by calling
interstate commerce local commerce in order to sustain its local control.
To state this persistent and protean problem of our federalism in the
form of a question· begging fiction, is not to answer it." (Central. Grey·
hcnl1ld Unes, [nco v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 659-660 [68 8.et. 1260, 92
L.Ed. 1633 J.)
tTh" quotation later in the opinion from Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monil!r, 266 C.S 555, 565 45 S.Ct. 184, 69 L.Ed. 439), also makes it
cleM thRt "the aforementioned activities of maintenance, repair and
manning by 1\ ('orporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce"
(33:) U.8. at 93) are acth-ities in interstate commerce. "In Ozark Pipe
Line v. Monier, 8l/pra. this court at p. 56ii spoke of such activities as
Ret out below." The note below (335 U.S. at 94) reads: "This court
lIaid. 266 U.8. at !i6il: • 'I'hp business actually earried on by appellant
was exclusively in interstnte commerce. The maintenance of an office,
the purchase of snpplies, employment of labor, maintenance and operation of telephone and telegraph lines and automobill:s, and appellant'.
other acts within the RtRte, were all exclush'ely in furtherance of its
interstate busineR8; and the property itself, however extensive or ot.
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no more immune from state and local taxation than local activities in maintaining and keeping in repair pipe lines that
deliver gas interstate. (See Ott v. Mississippi Barge Lines,
336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585].) These local
incidents of interstate commerce are separate and distinct
from the "very process of interstate commerce," such as
interstate transportation of commodities. They are carried on
entirely within the harbor of Los AngeJes. They are not
free from 10caJ taxation merely because" interstate commerce
could not be conducted without l themj . . . These are events
apart from the flow of commerce. This is a tax on activities
for which the state, not the United States, gives protection
and the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot
be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate
business." (Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, 96.)
The present case cannot be distinguished on the ground that
the tax is measured by gross receipts rather than by capital
employed in the state, as in the Memphis Natural Gas case,
for the United States Supreme Court has recently held that
a state tax may be imposed on gross receipts from interstate
transportation when apportioned to mileage within the taxing
state. (Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S.
653,663 [68 S.Ct.1260, 92 L.Ed.1633J.)
" All of these taxes in one way or another add to the expense
of carrying on interstate commerce, and in that sense burden
it; but they are not for that reason prohibited. On the other
hand, local taxes, measured by gross receipts from interstate
commerce, have often been pronounced unconstitutional. The
vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a
nature as to be capable, in point of substance, of being
imposed [citations J or added to [citations] with equal right
by every state which the commerce touches, merely because
interstate commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative
burdens not imposed on local commerce . . .
". . . Taxation measured by gross receipts from interstate
commerce has been sustained when fairly apportioned to the
commerce carried on within the taxing state [citations], and
in other cases has been rejected only because the apportionwhatever character, was likewise dc¥otedonly to that end. They were
tht' mennn and instrumeutlllitit's uy 1I'hirh that business lI'ns done Ilnd
in DO proper sensc constituted, or l'ontrilmt('d to, the doing of a local
bU8in~.' I I

)
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ment was found to be inadequate or unfair ..• it is a
tical way of laying upon tlle commerce its share of thc
t.ax burden without subjecting it to mUltiple taxation
borllt' by local commerce and to which it would be subject
gross receipts, unapportioned. could be made the
of a tax laid in every state where the commerce is
on . . . In the one case the tax reaches only that part of
commerce carried on within the taxing state: in the other
extends to the commerce carried on without the state hn"nrl_'tirI
aries, and. if valid, could be similarly laid in every other
in which the business is conducted." (Western Live Stock
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250. 255-257 [58 S.Ct. 54G.
L.Ed. 823. 115 A.L.R. 9441; Gwin. White ct Prince. Inc.
Henneford. 305 U.S. 434, 439 [59 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed. 272];;
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307. 311, 313 [58 S.Ct.
913.82 L.Ed. 1365, 117 A.L.R. 4291; McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Co., 309 U.S. 33,56-58 [60 S.Ct. 388. 84 L.Ed. 565, 128
A.L.R. 876] ; Dept. of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp.,.
313 U.S. 62.67 (61 S.Ct. 885, 85 L.Ed. 11881 ; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Gallagher. 306 U.S. 167, 177 [59 S.Ct. 389. 83 L.Ed.
5861 ; International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Trea.~ur1J, 322
U.S. 340.349 [64 S.Ct.l0I9,1030, 88 L.Ed.1313].) [5] When
there is no danger that several states will impose cumulative
tax burdens on the same subject, a tax upon an activity that
is a local incident of interstate commerce may be measured by
.{
gross receipts from that activity.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 [67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed.,!
265]. does not represent a departure from the cumulative ~.'
burdens test. That case involved the validity of the I ndiana ;~
i
Gross Income Tax as applied to proceeds from the sale of?
securities by an Indiana domicilary on the New York Stock'j
Exchange to a New York buyer, delivered in New York. The;
tax was held to be on the interstate sale, and. since it was
not apportioned and could be impQSed with equal right by '~.
every state that the commerce touched, it was invalid under
the rule of Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, "'tpra. The court has
interpreted it as authority for the invalidation of an unapportioned tax as a "direct burden" on interl!tate commerce.
(Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey. 334 U.S. 653. 663
[68 S.Ct. 1260,92 L.Ed. 1633].)
The vice of the tax in Freeman v. Hewitt was not the taxation of interstate commerce, but the danger that such commerce might be doubly taxed. The !ltate of the purchaser could
properly impose a tax upon the sale (McGoldrick v. Berunnd-

)
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White Co., 309 U.S. 33,47 [60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565, 128
A.L.R. 876] ; Freeman v. Beu-it, 329 U.S. 249, 257 [67 S.Ct.
274, 91 L.Ed. 265]), and an Indiana tax upon the same sale
would create the risk of a mUltiple tax burden that the sale
would not have borne had it been made solely intrastate. The
case therefore represents, not a repudiation of the cumulative
burdens test as plaintiffs imply, but a recognition of that test.
[6] The activities in the present rase .. are events apart
from the flow of commerce." (Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone, supra, 96.) They are carried on entirely within the
harbor of Los Angeles, and 8 tax thereon is therefore selfapportioning. The fact that the ships might require similar
service in the harbors of Seattle, Honolulu or New Orleans
does not make taxation by each jurisdietion a multiple tax
burden. "Like a property tax on the pipes or equipment in
different states, [each tax] would be a different tax, on a
different and wholly separate subject-matter, with no cumulative effect caused by the interstate character of the business."
(Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louislana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S.
60-1,613 [58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043].) Interstate commerce
is not unduly burdened because plaintiffs are required to bear
a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection they enjoy.
The cases of Puoet Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commilf$ton, 302 U.S. 90 [58 S.Ct. 72, 82 L.Ed. 68], and Joseph v.
Carter &- Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 [67 S.Ct. 81b.
91 L.Ed. 993], upon which plaintiffs rely, do not compel a
contrary result. The court in those eases invalidated gross
receipts ta:'tes on the business of loading and unloading cargo
shipped in interstate commerce, for the reason that these
activities were inseparable from the interstate transportation
of the cargo. Since that transportation was held not to be
complete until the cargo was Uilloaded at the final port of
call, a tax on "a continuation of the transportation" was held
to be a tax prohibited by the commerce clause for the reason
that it was imposed on "the very process of interstate commeree" as distinguished from a tax upon a local activity
related to interstate commerce. (Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 89 [68 S.Ct. 1475, 92 L.Ed. 1832] ; Freeman v. Bewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 [67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265].)
That part of plaintiffs' service that consists of loading ships'
stores aboard the vessels st'n-iced cannot be likened to the
stevedoring business held immune from state taxation in the
. . c.Jd-a

)

)
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Puget SOllnd and Carter & Weekes cases. There is a clear-.
distinction between the loading and transportation of COIII~
modi ties for shipment in interstate commerce and the loading"
of food and supplies to be consumed in the course of the jour-i
ney. The loading of ships' stores, of food, fuel, and supplies, t
is comparable to the business of a ships' chandler (Puget~:
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax CommissUm, 302 U.S. 90, 94 $
[58 S.Ct. 72, 82 L.Ed. 68]), or the sale and delivery of gaso."i
line to be consumed in flight by an interstate air carrier.;
(Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 285.~
U.S. 147, 153 [52 8. Ct. 340, 76 L.Ed. 673].) WhateverJ
immunity might attach to the interstate carriage of cargo does i
not extend to the delivery of food and fuel for consumption on l~
the carrier. (Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax ~
Comm., supra. ).~
The decisions of the court since the Carter & Weekes case:
indicate no intention to extend its application. Indeed, insofar
as the Carter & Weekes decision invalidates a tax on interstate .~
transportation even though it is fairly apportioned to activity:!
within the taxing state, its authority is questionable in view '
of the subsequent decision in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc.
v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 [68 S.Ot. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633].
That case involved the validity of a New York tax on the gross
receipts of the taxpayer from its transportation service, 43 i
per cent of which was conducted outside New York. Since the
tax was admittedly imposed on gross receipts from interstate
transportation, the reasoning of the Carter & Weekes case
would indicate that it was wholly invalid. The court, however, held the tax invalid only to the extent that it was imposed
on the entire gross receipts of the taxpayer, including those
attributable to that portion of the total mileage that was outside New York. It was expressly held that even though the
tax was imposed on gross receipts from interstate transportation, it would be upheld if apportioned to Inileage within the
taxing state. It is reasonable to assume that this decision indicates an intention to apply the cumulative burdens test to
taxation even of "the very processes of interstate commerce"
and that a different result would be reached if the Carter &
Weekes case were reconsidered in the light of that decision.
It is clear, however, that whatever vitality the immunity
of interstate transportation from state taxation may still
retain, it is not the intention of the court to extend it to local
activities and services in aid of that transportation, in vi..w of
the decision in the Memphis Natural Gas case, supra.

)

Feb. 1950]

MARTIN SHIP SERVICE CO. 11. CITY OF L.
[34 C.2d '193; 215 P.2d 241

A.

803

[7] Even under the broadest interpretation, plaintiffs'
business is not interstate transportation. .Their service does
not begin until that transportation has ended ~nd the transported cargo has been removed from the ships. Their aid to
the instrumentalities of that transportation is no more a part
of the interstate flow of commerce than the cab· service held
taxable in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U.S. 21,
26-27 [24 S.Ot. 202, 48 L.Ed. 325], cited with approval in the
Puget Sound case (302 U.S. 90, 93), or the local activities in
maintaining and keeping ,in repair pipe lines that deliver gas
interstate held taxable in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
BUpra, 335 U.S. 80.
[8] If plaintiffs' activities or the gross receipts therefrom
were the subject of the tax rather than its measure, there
could be no doubt as to the validity of the tax, in view of
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, 335 U.S. 80, and
Central GreyhO'Und Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, supra, 334 U.S. 653.
Since the subject of the tax is the privilege of engaging in
business activities and since plaintiffs' activities were interstate commerce, even though local incidents thereof, the question is raised whether the tax is void on the ground that the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is not a proper
subject of state and local taxation. The validity of the tax
would thus turn, not on its practical operation, but on the
descriptive label given it. (See Powell, Business Taxes and
The Federal Constitution, Proceedings of the Eigbteenth
Annual Conference of the National Tax Association (1925)
164,170-172.) A recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court, however, indicates that the court is "concerned with
the practical operation of challenged state tax statutes, not
with their descriptive labels." (Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co.
v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 [69 S.Ot. 1264, 1266, 93 L.Ed. 1613].)
That case involved the imposition by the state of Mississippi
of a business privilege tax of 2 per cent of the annual gross
receipts of "every person engaging ·or continuing within
this state in the business of operating a pipe line for transporting for compensation or hire from one point to another
in this state oil or natural gas or artificial gas through
pipes or conduits in this state." (Miss. Code, ~ 10109.) Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company, a foreign corporation qualified to
do busmess m Mississippi, owned and operated pipe lines for
the transmission of oil from Mississippi oil fields to loading
racks within the state for immediate rail transportation inter-
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state. The imposition of the tax was sustained by the .M.J,sslB8ilPpl~
Supreme Court as a tax "for the privilege of operating
pumping machinery and other pipe line equipment in
transportation of oil in the manner hereinbefore set
(Interstate Oil Pipe Line 00. v. Stone, 203 Miss. 715 [35
73,75,36 So.2d 142].) The corporation appealed, con'~U"""K,
that the tax was invalid as an imposition on the privilege
carryIng on an interstate business and that the
Natural Gas case could therefore be distinguished on
ground. Four justices, speaking through Mr. Justice RU~l"'llK'<I~
were willing to assume that the tax was upon the pri
of carrying on an interstate business, holding that "The
ute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of the
Constitution merely because, unlike the statute attacked
;
Memphis Gas 00. v. Stone, supra, it imposes a 'direct' tax o~'
the' privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce . . . Since"l
all the activities upon which the tax is imposed are carried OD.·~
in Mississippi, there is no due process objection to the tax;'
The tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce in'
favor of competing intrastate commerce of like character. The',
nature of the subject of taxation makes apportionment unnec- i
essary; there is no attempt to tax interstate activity carried'
on outside Mississippi's borders. No other state can repeat the'
tax. For these reasons the commerce clause does not invalidate
this tax." (69 S.Ct. at 1266·1267.) Mr. Justice Burton concurred in the judgment sustaining the tax, but on the ground
that the activities were intrastate commerce. Four dissenting
justices were of the opinion that the tax was on the privilege
of engaging in interstate transportation of oil and gas and was
invalid solely for that reason.
The disposition of the present case does not require
a resolution of these conflicting views. Even if the proposition stated by the dissenting justices in the Interstate Oil
case still has any vitality, it is not controlling here. The United
States Supreme Court has long distinguished between a tax
imposed on "the very processes of interstate commerce"
(Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,253 [67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed.
265 J ), such as transportation (Puget Sound Stevedoring 00.
v. Tax Oommtsswn, 302 U.S. 90 [58 S.Ct. 72, 82 L.Ed. 68];
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring 00., 330 U.S. 422 [67
S.Ct. 815, 91 L.Ed. 993]), and a tax imposed on local "incidents of the commerce." The force of this distinction is not
diminished by the fact that the challenged tax is imposed on
the privilege of conducting the local activities. In sustaining
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the tax in the Memphis Natural Gas case, IUpra, the court
expressly recognized that "The facts of this case present
again the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for
the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain activities
admittedly necessary to maintain or operate the interstate
business 9f-ihe taxpayer." (335 U.S. 80, 85.) There would
probably have been no disagreement in the Interstate Oil case
had the challenged tax been imposed on the privilege of
engaging in the local activities in aid of the interstate transportation of oil rather than on the privilege of engaging in
the "very process" of that transportation. The dissenting
justices made it clear at the outset that the tax was not "for
the privilege of operating pumping machinery or other equipment as incidents apart from the flow of the interstate commerce. Cf., Coverdale v. Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 [68 S.Ot.
736, 82 L.Ed. 1043]." ([337 U.S. 662] 69 S.Ct. 1264, 1268
[93 L.Ed. 1613].) When a tax is imposed on the privilege of
conducting a local activity separable :from the very processes
of interstate commerce, "it is idle to suggest that the tax is
on 'the privilege of engaging in interstate business.''' (Memphis NaturaZ Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85 [68 S.Ot. 1475,
92 L.Ed. 1832]; Central Greyhoufl,d Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,
334 U.S. 653, 661 [68 8.0t. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633].) A state
may properly impose a tax on the privilege of carrying on a
local activity, and the fact that the activity is essential to
interstate commerce does not "prevent a State from giving
[it] detached relevance for purposes of local taxation." (Ji'reeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 255 [67 S.Ot. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265];
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Bevefl,ue, 303 U.S. 250, 257
[58 s.Ot. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823, 115 A.L.R. 944] ; McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 47 [60 S.Ot. 388, 84 L.Ed.
565, 128 A.L.R. 876] ; Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los AngeZes,
10 Cal.2d 603, 609 [76 P.2d 97].) It is undisputed that plaintiffs' activities are conducted wholly within the jurisdiction
of the taxing authority and that plaintiffs are required to pay
only their share of the cost of the local government whose
protection they enjoy. For the privilege of carrying on those
activities, the city of Los Angeles can constitutionally impose
the challenged tax.
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Sebauer, J ..
and Spence, J., concurred.
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